

Jewgreek Justice and the Ethical Possibilities of the 'Post-'

Jane Mummery

Configuring the 'Post-'

With the focus of much of contemporary continental philosophy being the escaping of the conditions and constrictions of an ontotheologic metaphysics (to use an expression favoured by Martin Heidegger), its resultant instantiations have tended to comprise the common project of producing some sort of thinking of a 'post-'. It is with the possibilities of this 'post-'—possibilities which I suggest are delineated as ethical (at least by virtue of their shared instigation)—that this paper is concerned. So we have, for instance, picking a few of the instantiations associated with such possibilities, Jean-François Lyotard's proposed replacement of metaphysical delimitation and homogeneity through the theorizing of the excess and incommensurability of that heterogeneity opened by his thinking of agonistics, the differend and justice. Secondly, we have the Deleuzian projection of a thinking which *functions* otherwise than—therefore escaping from—the delimitative processes and systems seen as making up the metaphysical thinking of the State. Gilles Deleuze as such projects a thinking which as a "becoming," a "constructivism," unfolds and maps the rhizomatic logic of the "AND" rather than that of the ontological "IS."¹ Thirdly, Emmanuel Levinas is concerned to disclose what he considers the transcendently determined irreducibility of difference and (as) alterity—projected in terms of a witnessing of the infinite, the Absolute Other—as against what he sees as the reductive ontological "transmutation of the other into the same."² And, lastly, there is Jacques Derrida's deconstructive reinterpretations of closed metaphysical difference and logic into and as "différance" and "undecidability."

Now despite their heterogeneity—and indeed the thinking of the 'post-' as a thinking of heterogeneity and difference cannot be seen as a unified project—all of these projects can be seen to be founded upon and assuming certain Heideggerian themes, moves and depictions. For instance, depicted as ontotheologic, metaphysics is constitutively constrictive and enframing, it is a thinking of appropriation and the same, based on the economy and hegemony of return and identity. It is a thinking to be "overcome."³ What

I argue, then, is that this desired and attempted “overcoming” of metaphysics is also the attempt to develop a post-metaphysical ethics—an ethics of difference and alterity which is to be no longer dependent on either the grand narratives or the transcendental ideals associated with an ontotheologic or logocentric metaphysics.

This paper is structured in three parts. First of all I will briefly outline the shared structure of this desired “overcoming” of metaphysics. Also in this section I will sketch the main points driving the debate which has arisen around such attempts to develop a post-metaphysics. I will discuss not only the paradox which I suggest both structures and confounds much of this work, but also the debate which concerns questions of the potential utility of these proposed post-metaphysical ethical strategies in the broader socio-political domain. The second part of my paper will aim to develop a brief outline of the “jewgreek” justice which I draw from the work of Jacques Derrida and John D. Caputo.⁴ I suggest here that “jewgreek” justice perhaps exemplifies the possibility of an ethical post-metaphysics which does not founder in paradox. Lastly, in the final part, I will touch upon some of the possibilities and implications that “jewgreek” justice, as I have outlined it, might open for the socio-political domain, and the ethics and epistemology of the ‘post-’.

Post-Metaphysics: Paradox and Debate

To consider these possibilities, the starting point must be post-metaphysics: How is a post-metaphysics instantiated? How does it function? What does the ‘post-’ here really imply or entail? And how do projects for the production of a post-metaphysics relate to metaphysics itself? It is such questions and issues which I suggest are pertinent for any outline or debate of the ‘post-’.

Considered in such broad terms, then, what drives much of the thinking of a ‘post-’ to metaphysics is the perceived need to think difference and alterity differently, to rethink the way difference is considered to be structured and to function, and why. Following a Heideggerian analysis, then, difference under metaphysics is considered to be structured and to work in the name and pursuit of identity—absolute difference or dialectical difference, both can be seen to function as if sponsored by identity. Theories of the ‘post-’, on the other hand, aim to think difference in the name of difference and alterity, in a way that does not end in the metaphysical goals of identity or unity. Difference as such is to function to sustain alterity and heterogeneity, multiplicity rather than any ideal of the One, becoming rather than being. Rather than constituting a metaphysical process of delimitation and subsequent legitimation, difference for this conception of the ‘post-’ is the affirmation of that which cannot be enframed metaphysically.

The “overcoming” of metaphysics and thinking of the ‘post-’ are thus both based

upon a rethinking of difference. Rather than working to close things down, to affirm and legitimate a homogenized unity or identity, difference as rethought is to open things up and to keep them open. Indeed, for the 'post-' this rethinking of difference *is* the possibility for an ethics or justice able to think alterity, difference and heterogeneity non-appropriatively. In other words, it is this rethinking of difference which enables and substantiates a possible thinking of justice. It is consequently in the space of this double move—that is, rethinking difference to think justice—that I contend that much of the debate about the possibility and utility of the 'post-' is situated. I further suggest that this debate mainly centres around two issues. First of all, it concerns the instantiation of the 'post-' as based upon the rethinking of difference, in that such an instantiation is caught in a paradox. Secondly, debate has also arisen concerning the potential utility of these instantiations of the 'post-' in the broader socio-political domain.

Now the first of these issues giving rise to debate concerns the general mode of instantiation of a post-metaphysics. Projected through a rethinking of difference, the possibility of a post-metaphysics is dependent upon the instantiation of this rethinking, and it is here that a paradox can be seen to manifest itself. As I have already indicated, for the projection of a 'post-', metaphysics needs to be considered as the substantiation of an economy and hegemony of the same—a substantiation which is effected through the thinking of difference in the name of identity. Metaphysics, in other words, must be appropriative and enframing in order for the 'post-' to argue that metaphysics cannot as such think difference in the name of alterity. Characteristically, much of the thinking of the 'post-' affirms itself as open to difference and alterity, and therefore as ethical, by outlining metaphysics as constitutively closed and hence unjust.⁵

What this indicates, then, is that such a project of the 'post-' is itself caught in a paradox of self-constitution. That is, configurations of the 'post-' project themselves as open through the setting of a distinction which situates on one side the necessarily closed discourse of metaphysics defined as its functions of appropriation, totalization and homogenization. On the other side is situated the 'post-' which instantiates its possibilities *as* (or *as if they are*), by definition, unconditionally open—post-metaphysical in the sense of being absolutely other than metaphysical. This differentiation thus depends on the distinction itself operating as if it is rigid and impermeable, indeed absolute—a requirement which is at the least problematic in that the 'post-' constitutively places both the rigidity of metaphysical difference in question, along with the desire for and possibility of any absolutely pure instantiation.

Also problematic is this boundary itself. First of all, by its definition by the 'post-', metaphysics instantiates itself as if it can have or allow no outside or other—as the thinking of the One, it can have no boundary or outer edge as such. As such this boundary between—which is, furthermore, determining of—metaphysics and the 'post-', is posited (and situated) only by the 'post-', and thereby functionally represents what Derrida calls a “difference without presence.”⁶ Consequently, this determining boundary sets and reflects the paradox of what is an interpretative relation which is generated by and open only on the side of the 'post-', but which functions along the

same lines as the other, metaphysics. That is, under the framework or problematic set by the 'post-': if difference is rigid and naturalised, both controlled and controlling, it is a metaphysical structure operating in the name of identity. If, on the other hand, difference is outlined as contingent and flexible, uncontrollable and unpredictable, open to alterity and heterogeneity, it escapes and is other than metaphysical processes and structures. As such, the delineating and using of the difference between metaphysical structures and post-metaphysical projections as if it is both determining and rigid is itself a move which potentially sets a metaphysical difference back in place. Metaphysics is thus produced and interpreted as closed to alterity through a discourse which, even though by its own definition as 'post-' is non-totalizing and open to alterity and difference, disallows the affirmation of the other, if that other is metaphysics. As such the possibility for a justice or ethics open to difference, alterity and heterogeneity as projected through such thinking of the 'post-', depends upon a delimitative and rigid difference, a constitutively unethical and unjust—and thereby metaphysical—move. Hence, in being so constituted, such a 'post-' is functionally metaphysical rather than post-metaphysical, and is caught in and confounded by a negatively geared and self-referential paradox.

Through its problematizing of both the very possibility of the 'post-' and its constitution as ethical, this paradox has incited much of the debate surrounding the thinking of a post-metaphysics.⁷ Furthermore this paradox informs what I have outlined earlier as the second issue of debate with regards to the possibilities of the 'post-'—that is, the potential utility and application of its various configurations in the socio-political domain. Now this second issue for debate is exemplified by many of the questions and critiques directed at the various projections of the 'post-' figured in contemporary continental philosophy. These questions can be illustrated by those recently directed to Derrida: "[A]fter deconstruction, what is to be done? How are we to act?"⁸ We also have Richard Kearney asking Levinas whether "the ethical obligation to the other [is] a purely negative ideal, impossible to realize in our everyday being-in-the-world?" and whether ethics is "practicable in human society as we know it?"⁹ And we have Deleuze and Guattari being asked in a conversation with Catherine Backès-Clément on *Anti-Oedipus* not only about the "book's unity but of its practical implications." In her words the important question is that "if nothing can prevent 'fascist investments,' if no force can contain them, if all one can do is recognize they're there, [then] where do your political reflections get you, and what are you actually doing to change anything?"¹⁰ So what we have, then, is a common questioning of and demand for the actual or possible application of such thinking in the everyday socio-political domain—where the question is whether or not such thinking of the 'post-' can provide what Simon Critchley calls an "adequate account of political life."¹¹

Jewgreek Justice

Having considered the thinking of the 'post-' so far in terms of its problematic

depiction of and relation to metaphysics, its constitutively paradoxical structure, and voiced the question of its potential utility within the socio-political domain, I want now to turn to the possibility of a 'post-' which, I suggest, is not only not confounded by any paradox in its constitution, but is also perhaps able to engage within the socio-political domain. Now this possibility is instantiated, I argue, within what I have called, following Caputo, "jewgreek" justice—a term and possibility which I have drawn from the work of both Derrida and Caputo. This possibility for an ethical 'post-', unlike those setting themselves as absolutely other than metaphysics, not only questions the desire to abandon metaphysics, but argues that it is impossible to do so. Indeed, "jewgreek" justice configures itself as a 'post-' not through any dream or instantiation of absolute otherness, but in both sustaining the tension of the paradoxical relation between metaphysics and its 'post-', and situating itself within this tension. As Derrida comments: "we can pronounce not a single deconstructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest."

With regards to this recognition of the impossibility of absolutely escaping or abandoning metaphysics—an impossibility also recognized by Heidegger—"jewgreek" justice avoids its collapse into self-referential paradox by being instantiated through what Derrida has projected as a 'logic' of undecidability. Unfolded as that 'logic' able to "complicate—distinctly—the logic of binary oppositions,"¹⁴ undecidability is the disclosure of the inherent deconstructibility of assumed boundaries and distinctions. Undecidability discloses a methodological questioning, a deconstruction, which can never be "past or passed"—it does not represent, as Derrida stresses, any surmountable or sublatale moment.¹⁵ So constituted, then, this 'logic' marks the inherent deconstructability of every assurance of certainty or identity, including those which would aim to instantiate this 'logic' itself in the form of an absolute and positive 'post-'.

In its inability to instantiate any identity of either the 'post-' or metaphysics—and we must not forget that Derrida stresses that his determination of deconstruction "does not exist somewhere, pure, proper, self-identical"¹⁶—the 'logic' of undecidability is thus the disclosure and affirmation of the task and responsibility of deconstructive questioning, of, that is, this rethought 'post-'. As Derrida argues, this 'logic' opens the "field of decision or of decidability," of interpretation and judgement, disclosing every decision as "structured by [the] *experience and experiment of the undecidable*."¹⁷ However, far from culminating in a collapse into indecision or hesitation—an oft-suggested inadequacy of deconstruction when faced with the socio-political domain—Derrida suggests rather that this "*experience and experiment*" of undecidability results in an irrecusable call for a decision-making, an ethical thinking, which neither founds in the problematic of its constitution, nor closes itself down into the universalized and rigid prescriptions of an ontotheologic metaphysical justice. This experience of undecidability thus instantiates a call for justice, for a thinking which aspires neither to determine nor sustain identity over alterity or difference, nor to settle

and delimit undecidability.

So projected, the possibility of justice opened by deconstruction is instantiatable only in the form of a constitutively open promise for a hospitality and open(ed)ness towards the concept, event and singularity of the other which does not delimit that other. Disclosed through the irrecusable “trial and... passage... of the undecidable,”¹⁸ this configuration and promise of justice is constitutively in excess of any outline of justice as an “onto-theological or teleo-eschatological program or design,”¹⁹ where the latter conception of justice works to determine not only a ‘proper’ eventual singularity of the other, but ‘proper’ relations with that other. Instantiated rather as promise, and irreducible to and ungrounded by any totalized or systematic operations or economies of knowledge or identity, the justice disclosed by deconstruction is itself excessive, always to come and aware of the “precariousness of its effects.”²⁰

So configured, this justice is consequently unable to substantiate anything more than the possibility and passion for an ethical open(ed)ness before difference and alterity, where the stress is to be placed not on grounded ‘proper’ boundaries, criteria or relations, but rather on the undecidability and contingency of ungrounded relations and responsibility—that is, on difference rather than identity. Informed by the undecidability structuring all decisions and obligations, “jewgreek” justice opens the idea and possibility of justice from its constitution as an event of grounded, universalized and legitimated prescription—which is, by definition, concerned with sustaining given systems or situations—to the ungrounded and under-determined eventality and excessive responsibility of a being with others, with other others, in a non-appropriative and ethical way. This latter possibility as such depicts a mode of hospitality and responsibility which is irreducible to any economy or ethics of reciprocity or return, remaining rather on the lookout for and open to the coming and ‘eventality’ of other others. As disclosed by “jewgreek” justice, this being with others, obligation, is far from a practice of distinctions, returns and accounts.

So far, then, I have drawn my outline of “jewgreek” justice from Derrida’s work, and it still remains to be discussed as to how Caputo supplements Derrida’s instantiation of justice in terms of undecidability, promise and hospitality. Now, what I suggest Caputo does is to flesh out Derrida’s projection of this opened being with other others, configuring it as a concern for the fate and flesh—the event—of singularities in their fragility and contingency. Delineated minimally in terms of “flesh”—a term which Caputo uses in his *Against Ethics* to describe both the undecidable and factic eventality of singularities, and the site for obligations—Caputo argues that not only does the eventality of these singularities, of flesh, escape all projects of knowledge and universalized ethics, but it demands the configuration of an open(ed) and “demythologized” obligation.²¹ As outlined in *Against Ethics*, “jewgreek” justice requires the recognition and instantiation of obligation as enfleshed, where although “flesh” is undecidable—in Caputo’s words “both male and female, and neither male nor female,” indeed both “human and non-human”—the obligations it instantiates are nonetheless both urgent and irremissible. In Caputo’s enfleshing of “jewgreek” justice, obligation is being “face to face, [and] flesh

to flesh,” and, furthermore, without why. “Jewgreek” justice, in other words, opens and sustains an ethical mode of being with which is always already informed by the undecidability and contingency of flesh. Obligation, as Caputo here outlines it, is only possible and necessary within the domain of flesh. Configured in terms of flesh, “jewgreek” justice projects a being with, a hospitality entwined with obligation, which neither desires nor instantiates any ontotheologic principle or “Meta-event” with which to ground itself or its possibilities.²² In other words, “jewgreek” justice discloses a promise and a strategy for an ethical being with other others—the sustained (re)negotiation of difference, alterity and undecidability in terms of obligation and (as) flesh.

Possibilities and Implications

I have initially suggested that much of the discourse of the ‘post-’ founders in paradox. By this I mean that the desire to be and instantiate any absolute other to metaphysics—for instance, to instantiate a post-metaphysical ethical approach to difference and alterity which is to be absolutely distinct from metaphysics—is itself constitutively metaphysical. Consequently, projects desirous of configuring a moral horizon and ethical strategies which are to be no longer dependent on metaphysical ideals and grand narratives, remain stymied within self-referential paradox. However, in contrast to these problematic and indeed impossible desires, I suggest that a “jewgreek” justice drawn from the work of Derrida and Caputo perhaps exemplifies a thinking of a post-metaphysical ethics which does not so collapse.

“Jewgreek” justice is projected through a ‘logic’ of undecidability, where obligation and justice are not to be based on grounded distinctions, prescriptions or accounts. Rather “jewgreek” justice is concerned to deconstruct these latter functions and to affirm the possibility of a justice informed by contingency and undecidability, by the relational being with which constitutes what Caputo calls the eventality of “flesh.” Hence, in constituting and underpinning a possible ethical and open(ed) being with other others, justice and obligations can only be contextual, contingent and particular—that is, enfleshed. Furthermore, this “jewgreek” instantiation of obligation in terms of “flesh” and undecidability, stresses the precariousness and unfinishedness basic to obligation and justice—just as the event of flesh cannot be totalised or enframed, neither can obligation or justice. Structured as promise rather than law, and presenting no positively formulated ethical system, “jewgreek” justice is thus the possibility and question of a hospitality offered in the face (and risk) of an irrecusable undecidability, to that which is always already other and in difference. What, however, still needs to be briefly considered is whether “jewgreek” justice as so outlined can engage within the socio-political domain.

Now this is a question that Critchley asks of Derridean deconstruction, arguing that deconstruction unsupplemented is unable to be of positive use in the political arena, that it is both “too formalistic and abstract at the level of undecidability” and “too contingent and empty at the level of decision.”²³ Asked of “jewgreek” justice, however, I contend that such criticisms miss their mark, and that Caputo’s particular enfleshing of the deconstructive promise of a justice always to come works to situate this promise and this justice within the contingency, urgency and facticity of “flesh” and obligation, within, that is, the domain of the socio-political. Just as Critchley stresses the unavoidable “necessity for political decisions and political critique,”²⁴ so the “jewgreek” instantiation of justice stresses that “flesh” does not and cannot wait and that obligation happens without why.

Indeed, the “jewgreek” promise of a being with other others informed by an open(ed) hospitality, and sustained within the eventality and facticity of obligations and flesh, can only be negotiated within and as an open(ed) socio-political instantiation. Just as it exemplifies and cannot be dissociated from that ethical question(ing) indicative of all thinking of the ‘post-’, “jewgreek” justice is also constitutively informed by its question(ing) of the political, where the political is not to be configured in terms of any determinate practice or state, but rather in the light of the irrecusable undecidability and facticity of flesh and obligations. The socio-political, in other words, exemplifies the space and field of the strategic negotiation of this factic undecidability of obligation and (as) flesh, of, that is, justice. As Caputo glosses it, “jewgreek” justice marks an “ethics-becoming-politics,”²⁵ a thinking and an ethics which is informed by facticity rather than metaphysics. As an “ethics-becoming-politics,” “jewgreek” justice is thereby both question and reinterpretation, promise and possibility. What this means, then, is that whilst “jewgreek” justice is unable to develop or provide any positive outline for either an ethical or political theory, it substantiates a deconstructive questioning, the renegotiation and reinterpretation of given ethical and political structures and practices with an eye not to any perpetuation of the same, but to undecidability: a thinking open to difference and other others, that is, justice.

Consequently, with regards to its instantiation and affirmation of itself as promise with regards to the relations and facticity of flesh and decisions, “jewgreek” justice initially appears to be the counter to those questions asked of deconstruction by Critchley. Not only does “jewgreek” justice instantiate an opened and ethical decision-making—as opposed to any actual (prescribed and/or legitimated) decisions and practices—but it substantiates a possibility for a being with other others which is neither totalizing nor prescriptive. That is, as always already informed by flesh and situated within the eventality of a being with other others, “jewgreek” justice instantiates a passion for an ethico-political thinking, a model for a deconstructive negotiation which is not directed by any metaphysical principle of or desire for identity. Indeed, in outlining “jewgreek” justice as (and as enabling of) a factically situated and ethically driven renegotiation and reinterpretation of structures, economies and relations of difference, identity, prescription and obligation in terms of undecidability, I have already instantiated it as

situated within that space Critchley outlines as the political—that is, the factual site of relations, questioning and decision-making.

Instantiating and negotiating the eventality, facticity and irrecusability of decision(s) and obligation(s) at the level of the inter-relatedness and fragility of flesh—negotiations which can neither be closed nor formalised—“jewgreek” justice is thus inscribed within the socio-political. That is, the notion and function of a socio-political, of being with, instantiates and sustains the ethical promise of “jewgreek” justice in its ceaseless attention to and negotiation of the eventality, facticity and undecidability of flesh and obligations. Furthermore, it is its instantiation within and renegotiation of both undecidability and the factual which keeps “jewgreek” justice open, always already on the lookout for the instances and eventality of obligation resultant from the coming of and being with other others. Hence, although this “jewgreek” justice cannot be seen as aiming to substantiate any prescribed or legitimated positivity—any actual or possible ethico-political system—it exemplifies an open(ed)ness and rigorously ethical attentiveness to difference and undecidability, to other others, through its inscription as promise and negotiation.

In other words, then, in its interlacing of its instantiation as promise, the precariousness and contingency of the enfleshed facticity of obligation, and its projection of a decision-making and negotiation opened and informed by undecidability, “jewgreek” justice exemplifies an ethical instantiation of the ‘post-’ which has no pretensions to the absolute escape of metaphysics, and which thereby does not founder in self-referential paradox. Now what I suggest this means, then, is that all of those projects of the ‘post-’ which aim to project and develop an epistemology or ethics absolutely irreducible to those substantiated by metaphysical ideals or grand narratives, need to rethink their base. That is, attempts to project an other to metaphysics assume the possibility of an escape from metaphysics, and thereby circle back into metaphysics and paradox. Nonetheless, regarding contemporary attempts to develop a moral horizon or ethical strategies both irreducible to metaphysics and useful in the socio-political arena, I suggest that the “jewgreek” justice projected by Derrida and Caputo—a promise inscribed within a ‘logic’ of undecidability and of flesh—perhaps exemplifies one open possibility or path. “Jewgreek” justice, then, might indicate one way for the contemporary project of a post-metaphysical ethics to proceed unstymied by paradox and remain open and responsive to alterity, difference and heterogeneity, to undecidability. Sustained as an open(ed) potentiality for negotiation and being with, and informed by the undecidability and facticity of obligations and “flesh,” “jewgreek” justice is thus exemplary of one strategic post-metaphysical and ethical possibility that is irreducible to either the prescriptions or accounts made and kept by metaphysics or the metaphysical ‘post-’.

Jane Mummery
Murdoch University

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Notes

1. See Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia UP, 1995). Deleuze explores the concepts of “becoming” and the “rhizome” with Félix Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987).
2. Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” trans. Alphonso Lingis, *Collected Philosophical Papers* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993) 49-50.
3. For Heidegger’s discussion of metaphysics as ontotheologic, see his *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). For his discussion of the possibility of “overcoming” metaphysics see, for instance, *The End of Philosophy*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (London: Souvenir Press, 1975).
4. Derrida uses this term in his early discussion of Levinas’s project. See Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” trans. Alan Bass, *Writing and Difference* (London: Routledge, 1978) 153. Caputo, in his turn, uses it throughout his work as enabling and characterising the possibility of a minimally metaphysical justice. “Jewgreek” justice, as Caputo glosses it, is the possibility of a miscegenated and non-originary justice which is to be projected in terms of the eventality and contingency of “flesh.” Caputo explores such a notion of justice and (as) obligation, albeit also under different names, in his *Radical Hermeneutics* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1987), *Against Ethics* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1993), *Demythologizing Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1993), *Deconstruction in a Nutshell* (New York: Fordham UP, 1997), *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1997), and *More Radical Hermeneutics* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2000).
5. This outline of both metaphysics and the ‘post-’ is, I suggest, common to many of the projects usually seen as constituting the ‘post-’. Certainly this model can be seen to inform the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and Richard Rorty, to name only some of the theorists associated with the ‘post-’.
6. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981) 210.
7. Much of Derrida’s work is, of course, concerned with deconstructing both this paradox and its implications. I want to suggest that this concern is not only constitutive of deconstruction, but holds the possibility of a post-metaphysics which neither results in nor is confounded by this paradox.
8. Jacques Derrida, “Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: a Dialogue with Jacques Derrida,” *Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy*, ed. Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (London: Routledge, 1999) 65.
9. Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics of the Infinite,” *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers*, ed. Richard Kearney (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1986) 64.
10. Deleuze, *Negotiations* 18.
11. Simon Critchley, “The Question of the Question: An Ethico-Political Response to a Note in Derrida’s *De L’esprit*,” *Of Derrida, Heidegger, and Spirit*, ed. David Wood (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1993) 102. Such questions also inform Critchley’s discussion of Derridean deconstruction in *The Ethics of Deconstruction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
12. Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” trans. Alan Bass, *Writing and Difference* (London: Routledge, 1978) 280-281.

13. See, for instance, Martin Heidegger, *The Question of Being*, trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback (New Haven: College and UP, 1958) 93: "It is hardly possible to surpass the grotesqueness of proclaiming my attempts at thinking as smashing metaphysics to bits."
14. Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, trans. Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1995) 127, cf. 117.
15. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority'," trans. Mary Quaintance, *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, ed. Drucilla Cornell et al (New York: Routledge, 1992) 24.
16. Derrida, *Limited Inc.* 141.
17. Derrida, *Limited Inc.* 116.
18. Derrida, *Limited Inc.* 116.
19. Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994) 75.
20. Jacques Derrida, "Living On: Border Lines," trans. James Hulbert, *Deconstruction and Criticism*, ed. Harold Bloom et al (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979) 102.
21. Used initially by Caputo with reference to the possibility and project of reading Heidegger against himself, demythologizing his work, as delineated in his *Demythologizing Heidegger*, I suggest that Caputo also discusses ethics and obligation as needing to be demythologized and decapitalized.
22. See Caputo, *Against Ethics* 209, 210, 142, 213, 222.
23. Critchley, "The Question of the Question: An Ethico-Political Response to a Note in Derrida's *De L'esprit*" 102. For a response considering whether these points indeed provide a relevant critique of Derridean deconstruction, see Morag Patrick, "Excess and Responsibility: Derrida's Ethico-Political Thinking," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 28.2 (1997): 160-177.
24. Critchley, "The Question of the Question: An Ethico-Political Response to a Note in Derrida's *De L'esprit*" 101.
25. Caputo, *More Radical Hermeneutics* 64.

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